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Ruptured space and spatial estrangement: (Un)making of public space in 
Kathmandu 
 
Abstract: Public space is increasingly recognized to be central to spatial discourse of 
cities. A city’s urbanism is set in display in public spaces representing myriad of 
complex socio-cultural, economic, and democratic practices of everyday life. In cities of 
the global south, especially those with nascent democracies, different values attached to 
a space by various actors – both material and symbolic – frame the contestation, making 
the physical space a normative instrument for contestation. Tundikhel, once believed to 
be the largest open space in Asia, is an important part of Kathmandu’s urbanism, which 
has witnessed two civil wars popularly known as Jana Andolans, and the subsequent 
political upheavals, to emerge as the symbolic meeting point of the city, democracy, and 
its people. The paper argues that the confluence of the three modalities of power – 
institutionalization, militarization, and informalization – has underpinned its historical 
transformation resulting in what I call ‘urban rupturing’: a process of (un) making of 
public space, through physical and symbolic fragmentation and spatial estrangement. 
The paper contends that unlike the common notion that public spaces such as Tundikhel 
are quintessentially public, hypocrisy is inherent to the ‘publicness’ agenda of the state 
and the institutional machinery in Kathmandu. It is an urban condition that not only 
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maligns the public space agenda but also creeps into other spheres of urban 
development. 
Keywords: Public space , institutionalization , Militarization , Informalization , 
Kathmandu, planning, Urbanisation and developing countries, Built environment 
Introduction 
 
Public space is increasingly recognized to be central to spatial discourse of cities. Particularly in the 
global south, city’s urbanism, defined by the milieu of different urban components that provides order and 
contestation, is set in display in public spaces representing myriad of complex socio-cultural, economic, 
and democratic practices (or lack thereof) in everyday life. The material and symbolic values attached to 
space by various actors frame these practices, making the physical space an instrument for contestation 
and domination. Increasingly, contestations emerge from the conscious or subconscious desire to 
introduce a sense of order and control by the state (Benjamin, 2008; Mitchell, 1995; Mitchell and 
Staeheli, 2006), informal insurgent forces (Appadurai, 2001, 2000; Hackenbroch, 2013; Perera, 2009) and 
the military (Dovey, 2001; Padawangi, 2013; Samara, 2010), creating new forms of governance, network, 
and dominance. These modalities of power establish a claim on the space as they see this as a way to 
connect to the city, its history, and the space itself. Much less understood, however, is their impact, which 
determines the nature and the extent of a space being public (or not).  
 
In nascent democracies such as Nepal, Tibet, Vietnam, or Sri Lanka suffering from fledgling economy, 
weak governance, or longstanding ethnic or political conflicts, authoritarian and political deliberation 
become the chosen mode of governance to establish hegemonic rights. Boundaries are blurred between 
civil and military, private and public, formal and informal simultaneously displaying both ‘order’ and 
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‘chaos’ built into everyday life and practices. The militancy psyche (and the ‘fear’ that results) is not 
always that of the ‘outsiders’, but very often stems from the war at home arising from authoritarian rule or 
religious, ethnic and political conflicts. The ‘ordered’ view is challenged by the invasion from a city’s 
urban poor and informal enterprises (Brown et al, 2010; Hackenbroch, 2013; Hackenbroch et al, 2009) 
consistent attempts to occupy the space defying the bourgeoisie’s  control of the space through policies, 
regulations, and coercion. Where unequal power relations prevail, informality helps to balance the 
concentration of power, introducing redistributive practices into the use, ownership, and concept of 
‘public space’, giving it a new meaning. Both authoritarian deliberation and democratic practices are thus 
seen merging into a single frame to govern the public space, its configuration, and the extent of its 
publicness thereby making it important to examine them together. 
 
Tundikhel in Kathmandu offers interesting insights into the complex interplay of powerful forces against 
the backdrop of longstanding conflict. Once believed to be the largest open space in Asia, this central 
public space is an important part of the city’s urbanism, which has witnessed two civil wars, popularly 
known as Jana Andolans, and the subsequent political upheavals1 to emerge as the symbolic meeting 
point of the city, its democracy and people. It has been at the epicenter of the democratic movement of 
Nepal, which is rapidly emerging from 300 years of absolute monarchy and is trying to find its feet in 
                                                
1 In 1990 the popular people’s movement or the Jana Andolan led to the restoration of multiparty democracy. New 
constitution limited the monarchy's role, retained Nepal as a Hindu kingdom and paved the way for parliamentary system 
and grants fundamental rights. However, the radical left parties rejected the constitution ultimately launching people's war 
which is called Maoist movement. In the process, in 2001 King Birendra and his immediate families were massacred. The 
official investigation indicts crown prince Dipendra amid widespread speculation of a conspiracy. Birendra's younger 
brother Gyanendra took over as the monarch. A brief interlude of peace was observed with the ceasefire (brokered by 
India) which soon collapsed with the Maoist attack on the barracks of Nepal army. The King dissolved the government 
and declared emergency and deployed Nepal army and civil war intensified. The second Jana Andolan in 2006 lasted for 19 
days of people’s movement and King Gyanendra conceded the sovereignty to rest with the people. Consequently, the 
monarch was reduced to become a constitutional monarch and Nepal army was brought under civilian rule and the 
country was declared a secular republic. The political crisis still continues with frequent government changes fuelled by 
internal differences. In recent years, various factions of pro-India Madhesi parties are at loggerheads with the government 
alleging widespread discrimination. (See Jha, 2016) 
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search of democracy. Historically, Tundikhel played an important role as a space for religious, cultural, 
social, and political activism signifying Lefebvre’s (1991) spaces of ‘representation and representational 
space’. Since the abolition of the monarchy on 28 May 2008, Tundikhel has witnessed a greater 
constellation of forces – institutional, military, and informal insurgency – competing to establish the 
sovereign rights to occupy and govern this space. The extent of their control, however, highlights the 
concurrent identity and political structure of the city, displaying a distinct characteristic of (dis)order. It 
also manifests the dominant spatial modalities, opening up fresh new insights into public space discourse 
not only in Nepalese case but also in other cities emerging from similar contexts where public space as an 
instrument of contestation is transforming into an instrument of domination. 
 
 
The purpose of the paper is twofold. Firstly, the paper seeks to expand on scholarship from a relatively 
lesser-known city of the world by presenting an in-depth discussion of Tundikhel, the largest urban public 
space in Kathmandu. Secondly, the paper examines what I call the ‘estranged spatialities’ that resulted 
from three strands of contemporary discourses – institutionalization, militarization, and informalization – 
coming together not only to dismantle the very purpose of Tundikhel as a public space but also to rupture 
the ‘space’ as we know it. The paper argues that the current public space construct in Kathmandu must be 
seen as an entanglement of complex, multilayered, and multifaceted conditions, where conflicts come 
naturally into play, leading to contradictions and estrangement of spaces. The incidence of spatial 
rupturing has intensified during the political transformation from absolute monarchy to republicanism, 
signifying new forms of inequality in the public sphere and an affront to the democratic aspirations of the 
‘New Nepal2’.   
 
                                                
2
 The ‘New Nepal' became the popular anti-establishment slogan during the recent political struggle to describe the new 
democratic conditions that would follow the transfer of powers from the monarchy to civilian government. 
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In the next section, the paper begins by piecing together some of the recent literature on the current 
debates on public space, particularly in terms of different modalities of power that the paper posits – 
institutionalization, militarization, and informalization. The third section examines each of these 
discourses in turn against the backdrop of Tundikhel. In the concluding section, the paper draws together 
strands from the discussion and argues that the contestation has led to ‘spatial estrangement’ – a process 
of (un)making of public spaces through ‘urban rupturing’. In this transition, oddly we are left without a 
conception of public space that is distinctly public. Information was collected using both structured and 
unstructured observations3, spatial-combing, and archival research including a stakeholder workshop4 
held in Kathmandu in 2015.  
 
 
 
Framing space and the city: Public space in contestations and spatial evocations 
 
Historically public spaces are considered timeless, transformational and an elusive entity in a city’s 
urbanism. The scholarship on public spaces in recent decades has centered on the transformation of public 
spaces that underpins their celebrated and contested nature based on various processes of urban 
interventions. This section will focus on three strands of interventions in the public space – 
institutionalization, militarization, and informalization – that typically underpin and help define the 
contestation, especially in cities experiencing longstanding conflict and political transformation per se, 
                                                
3
The fieldwork comprised structured observations which involved activity mapping for different parts of Tundikhel to 
establish the extent of public access and use. Tundikhel was surveyed both in the weekday and weekends, three times a 
day for a period of one month.  Unstructured observation included recording activities and behaviour patterns using field 
notes, photographs and videos where possible at any time of the day/week throughout the fieldwork period. 
 
4
 A symposium on Tundikhel was organized in September 2015, which was attended by academics, policymakers, KMC 
representatives, UNESCO Officials and urban historians.  The symposium was immensely beneficial to capture the 
‘unofficial’ views of administrators and stakeholders. 
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absolute monarchy to democracy or aristocratic dominance to more democratic ‘people-centric’ regimes. 
Each has a story. Each contributes to our understanding of the new spatial and spatiotemporal conditions. 
Now it should not be thought that the conflation of these three discourses is merely an empirical issue. On 
the contrary, it has practical political consequences that construct the new ‘urbanism’ in these cities. They 
might appear as fragmentary forces, but together they demonstrate multiple spatialities and temporalities 
within the dynamic city system. The uses of the space are continually shifting and expanding to 
accommodate constantly changing functions, agencies, and meanings. For example, this happens when 
agitational campaigns and dharnas against an oppressive political regime are confounded with ‘disorder 
and crime’, or when struggle to install the vending barrows by the rural migrants is equated with 
‘commodification’ of space. In both cases, the result is to occlude the question whether to subject public 
space to the logic of the insurgent urbanism or the state is to promote a freely admissible and a democratic 
public space. Despite this heterogeneity within the public space and disjunction between various agents 
and functions, it ultimately functions as a whole and we read it accordingly.  
 
Institutionalization of public space is rooted in the notion that public space is primarily a responsibility of 
state authority, which engages in its re-appropriation to create order and security (Benjamin, 2008; 
Mitchell, 1995; Mitchell and Staeheli, 2006) administered through regulations and rights. An institutional 
framework not only defines boundaries, controls access, and grants publicness but also extends control 
over public spaces for sovereign rights. Marvin’s (2013) analysis of Chinese colonial rule over Tibet 
describes how sovereign rights are executed through the creation of ‘presumptive’ spaces, which are not 
just symbols of restrictions but also the centers of conflict between Chinese authorities and Tibetans who 
are deprived of any instruments of democracy. For indigenous Tibetans, the use of the public space is 
related to their ‘natural’ and ‘civil’ rights despite being fully aware their most important and holy public 
space in Barkhor is ringed with surveillance. Likewise, Chinese authorities are aware that they are 
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vulnerable to international criticism if their confrontations with Tibetans catch the attention of 
international media, revealing the structure of force that represses Tibetan protests and religious activity. 
More importantly, it endangers the touristic romance that translates into revenues in Lhasa (Marvin, 
2013:1471). The enterprising Chinese state sees the space as a potential neoliberal object. This makes 
Barkhor a presumptive space with multiple meanings, imaginations, and agencies. Real spaces with 
ordinary qualities turn into celebratory spaces – a shift from an ‘ordinary’ to a ‘celebratory’ or ‘cherished’ 
space – where ‘non-ordinary’ behavior becomes the norm. In such transition, however, space is usurped 
by the dominant groups and over time lost from the public domain altogether. Padawangi (2013) laments 
Jakarta’s subjection of public space provision under the authority of the ruling power to turn celebratory 
spaces of displaying power within the context of a fundamentally unequal society. Such institutional 
assertiveness is made more complex by the advent of neoliberalism that sees entrepreneurial states 
altering their modes of operation to become de facto landowners and formidable economic actors looking 
for ways to re-appropriate the public space for economic gain. The institutional influence on public space 
appears to hold grounds regardless of nature of the state it is connected to. Especially in countries riddled 
with conflict such as Nepal the boundary between democracy and autocracy is often blurred and even within 
the democratic envelope, splinter autocracies appear to exist as certain institutions and organisations can still 
choose to operate in autocratic ways and vice versa. 
 
Not bound by geography, the expansion of neoliberalization takes its own cultural forms.  
Hackenbroch (2013), in her study of access to public space and water supply in Dhaka, describes how 
poor voters support the formal system to gain political support to produce exclusionary and 
discriminatory outcomes leading to “organized encroachment of the powerful”, represented by the strong 
network of relations between institutions and individual actors of political society (416) where they all 
have some neoliberal agenda. This manifests itself in all groups of the society. For the ordinary citizens, 
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this ‘encroachment’ is about gaining access to urban amenities and services, but for institutions, it is 
about gaining power and political supremacy by controlling access to resources. Interestingly, however, 
such political inimitability can even produce quasi-state powers5 to enforce moral and cultural code, as 
executed by Shiv Sena in Mumbai or the Maoist cadres in Kathmandu, suggesting informality to be 
inseparable from formality. The profound upheavals that ensue from political struggle quickly raise the 
prospect of de jure informal insurgency that seeks to counter-balance dominant spatial modalities. In 
apparent public takeover of space, the post-independence Jakarta witnessed public spaces evolve into 
‘megaphones’ for grass-roots movements (Padawangi, 2013), while in Bangalore, public space 
engendered what Benjamin (2008) calls ‘occupancy urbanism’. Both underscore powers of informal 
insurgency in subverting the logic of military urbanism and institutionalized dominance – deemed 
formalization of space that allows groups to make democratic claims, demands, and protests, where 
spatialities, sovereignty, and rights are constructed, negotiated, and contested (Dovey, 2001, Marvin, 
2013). Informality is thus useful because, considered as an active agent in social and physical production, 
it provides us with the liberating force to enable us to experience public space in alternative ways. People 
make cities. In such formulation, informality by virtue of being people-driven, is seen as a tool for non-
spatial consciousness to the materiality reflecting our inherent humanistic relationship with space (public 
space) in universal ways.   
 
Owing to the heterogeneity of actions of diverse groups and the difficulty of offering a uniform response, 
state institutions tend to rely on traditional methods of control and order through both soft and hard 
measures. Soft approaches often take the form of municipal by-laws that interestingly are routinely 
applied to what Samara (2010) calls a ‘surplus’ population – the poor and vulnerable – but relaxed for 
                                                
5
 Shiv Sena is a Mumbai-based Hindu Right Wing political party, that proclaims itself the defender of Indian values. The group 
regularly made headlines by mobilizing its cadres against, Valentine's Day celebrations, Mumbai dance bars and beauty pageants 
using coercion and intimidation (See, Varughese, 2014). Likewise, Maoist splinter called Youth Maoist League (YPL) opposed 
street festivals, westernization of culture and quite significantly, private school operations (See, Refugee Review Tribunal, 2008). 
Whilst the YPL in Kathmandu has now been dissolved, the Shiv Sena in Mumbai continues to exist and exert cultural defence. 
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elites in the dominant position. According to him, “the creation or expansion of municipal by-laws 
targeting the urban poor and informal economy, aggressive enforcement of law and order, and the literal 
or de facto privatization of public space all contribute to spatial fragmentation and a massive fortification 
of the spaces between rich and poor” (199). As an intersection of people and power, public space 
naturally plays a prominent role in establishing order and paving the way for implanting hard measures 
that articulate policification and militarization. State institutions enforce regulations and deliver welfare 
provisions often with support from the police and, in some cases, the military. The massively militarized 
elections in parts of the global south only corroborate how democratic functions are supported by the 
military and how they are played out in the public sphere. On the other hand, the logic of state 
militarization is often situational (effective in certain contexts) and relational (they only exist in 
opposition to other categories) (Castro, 2013). For instance, the military has played two important roles in 
the history of conflict in Nepal. Up until the 1990s, the military played a crucial role in protecting the 
Royals and royal institutions; however, post-1990s, they helped the state in diffusing the Maoist 
opposition. Thus, the same agency is seen as having multiple identities and roles in the history. A central 
paradox, however, is the ‘military-encroachment of the public space’, as inevitably, the presence of the 
military in the city embodies transfer of sandbags, check posts and barracks from the borders into the 
streets and public spaces, creating new frontiers of barriers and divisions. These divisions are both visual 
and spatial, a common byproduct of persistent political instability. Over time these barriers start to 
achieve a sense of permanence, with high walls and barbed wires rupturing the space.  
 
Literature is rife with allusions to public space shaped by complex structure and differentiated symbolic 
discourses. The heuristic intervention of state and military in public spaces is deemed both real 
(restriction of access, speech, and action in everyday life) and metaphorical (emblematic of the death of 
the values of free society); the resurgence of grass-roots, be they informal traders or political activists, is 
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beset with realism (livelihood) and idealism (counter-movement). Despite these contributions, the 
construction of public space in nascent democracies remains unexamined. More importantly, a coherent 
framework to explain how public space is connected with state spatialities warrants a deeper 
understanding of the confluence of the three discourses discussed above that position public space at the 
historic crossroads where the sum of parts is greater than the whole. They comprise, what Bridge and 
Watson (2010: 371) call, the confluence of the publics and cultures, deeply entwined offering up 
complex, sometimes conflictual, relationships that define the politics of the urban in general. The three 
discourses are not mutually exclusive. They are sometimes complementary and sometimes in conflict, and 
together they create an urban condition that fosters contestation and eventual rupturing. However, what 
remains unexamined is the eventual rupturing of the space as a result of the modalities of power it helps 
to sustain.  
 
In order to demonstrate the spatial discourses of power, people, and sovereignty, I shall now focus on 
Tundikhel in the following section. 
 
 
Tundikhel: A brief spatial history  
 
The traceable history of Tundikhel goes back to medieval times, when Kathmandu was a mercantile and 
intellectual center. Anecdotal evidence exists from that ancient period, of Kathmandu being on the trade 
route between India and Tibet (Shrestha, 1981) and Tundikhel providing a camping ground. Successive 
rulers such as the Licchavis (300 AD-879 AD), the Mallas (1200 AD-1769 AD), and the Shahs (1769 
AD-1846 AD) regarded palace squares and public spaces as the center of cultural, military, and social 
functions. Public spaces became multifunctional spaces with extended involvement of ‘royal institution’ 
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in the society (Sengupta and Upadhyay, 2016). The power of the palace was provided with cultural 
rationales through the co-option of religious festivals by the royal family (Routledge, 1994). 
Contemporary history marks the important milestone in Tundikhel’s function as a site for displaying 
might and sight. Use of central space for a military and authoritarian display of power was the hallmark of 
successive Rana rulers (between 1845 AD and 1951 AD). The need for ostentatious displays of power 
and pride grew stronger to save the monarchy, resulting in growing military use of Tundikhel as a training 
ground for Nepalese (Gurkha) soldiers.  
 
Insert Figure 1 
 
The Early Shah Period also marks an important phase in spatial history, with the expansion of the old city 
of Kathmandu, which would eventually bring Tundikhel from its peripheral location to the center of the 
city and reinforce its role as the central space through which political hegemony was established. The 
Rana Period, which spanned 105 years, further strengthened this spatial expansion. Seen by many as a 
feudal-fascist regime that thrived on instituting oppression agains its citizens, Rana rulers learnt the imperial art 
of instrumentalizing urban space and monumental architecture to lay claims on power and dominance over 
space. End of Rana rule in 1951 was marked by the advent of modernity and liberation and the power returned 
to Shah Kings that effectively reinstated the same fascist approach to governance. Military, staying very close 
to the Royals, was rewarded with spaces of premium in the city including parts of Tundikhel The 
construction of the army Headquarters in 1989 formally established the permanent claim on the city’s 
only remaining urban open space. Since 1996, the country witnessed a seismic change in political 
landscape fueled by Maoist uprising leading to abolition of monarchy and eventual accession to power as a 
political party. Although paradoxical, the Maoist dominance in political sphere, economic sphere has remained 
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independent attributed (mainly) to the pressures from donor agencies. In recent years the government has 
instituted liberal economy and opened up to new investments firmly adopting neoliberal ideals.    
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
Tundikhel thus symbolizes different layers of planning and development achievements of different 
political periods to which the turn of the century added a new dimension. The struggle for democracy that 
continued well over a decade saw Tundikhel playing an important role, from being a ‘royal ground’, it 
evolved into democracy’s ‘battleground’ where all forms of political power, including military and 
democratic forces, collide. The exclusionary process of class formation instituted by the ‘Royals’ and the 
respect they commanded for centuries was challenged by a defensive informal outbreak. With the 
ubiquitous media presence capturing the political struggle by transmitting images and actions, 
Tundikhel’s visual and metaphorical appeal as a space of emancipation has surpassed its appeal as a space 
of grandeur and beauty in the public imagination’. Tundikhel became a public space in a true sense that 
showed great potential to renew the value of social life quite in line with the Lefebvrian (1991: 38) notion 
of “lived space as co-created common life”. The open field of about 30ha of land sandwiched between the 
new and old quarters of the city (Figure 1) simultaneously became the site for liberation and royalty – a 
mediator between the power and the powerless. However, the specter of control has never been absent 
from Tundikhel, reflecting the complex hierarchical socio-economy of the time, on which the fascist 
regime was run. As argued by Drummond (2000) in her study of public spaces in Vietnam, the country 
had a little history or concept of public space – it was a social vacuum that had been filled by the 
authority of the emperor/state with little place for Western-style public discussion or expression. This 
exclusionary operation was considered an essential mechanism to control the ‘public’, and exclusions 
were rooted in the process of class formation6. The resultant chaos was of our own imagining – the 
                                                
6
 This was necessitated by the society that was divided into four main castes – Brahmins, Chettris, Vaishyas and 
Shudras with clearly defined roles, which however has been the source of sublime tension across the castes hierarchy 
due to its discriminatory connotation. The four classes - varna - encompassed a total of 64 castes jat within it. 
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product of royal or at times the institutional addiction to mechanical order – here we see the order of life 
in development. 
 
 
The unmaking of Tundikhel: Ruptured spaces and estranged spatialities 
 
Tundikhel today is the largest civic precinct in Kathmandu, surrounded by some of the busiest routes and 
builtform that reflects the predominance of commercial and institutional uses interspersed by monuments 
and temples from the medieval period. Until about the middle of the 19th century, it existed as a single 
expansive open space, uninterrupted by either buildings or road network. Currently, two major roads 
flank Tundikhel, built during the Rana Period as the first set of through roads linking Singha Durbar and 
Narayanhiti Palace marking the advent of modernism in Kathmandu. A trunk road bisects Tundikhel in 
the north, marking permanent severance in historical association of Ratna Park with Rani Pokhari 
(Queen’s Pond). To the south, Tundikhel is separated by Shukra Path, a road built in commemoration of 
martyrs with the historic sculpture locally known as Shahid Gate built right in the middle of a four-lane 
carriageway (Figure 2). This symbolized an indelible disconnection with space to the south (occupied by 
Nepal Army) from  
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Insert Figure 2 
the greater mass of Tundikhel. Rai (2002) noted that the historic shrinkage of Tundikhel is striking as 
space shrank from 60ha to 30ha over the span of 100 years. Segregation and fragmentation are two 
enduring trends of this transformation, created using both symbolic and physical barriers instituted by 
wider interventions resulting from institutionalization, militarization, and informalization. These 
interventions have come together to become a formidable force that breaks the linearity of the space into 
smaller pockets (see figure 3), that are either controlled or out of bounds. They enclose discrete pockets of 
space introduce relative solidity to the space itself affecting the impression of its orientational thrust.  
 
Institutionalization  
Institutionalization provides a framework to bring resources into the public domain. In a regressive step, it 
can also introduce control, which reverses this process. In an ideal world, institutions provide basic 
provision in the interests of all citizens (Mitchell, 1995), closing the gap between the rich and the poor, 
the privileged and the powerless. In Nepal, historically the state/institution’s role has been minimal in 
welfare provisions such as healthcare, housing, or access to resources and amenities including open 
spaces, due to budgetary constraints and lack of vision. It is one of the least developed countries in the 
world, with over 30 percent population living below the absolute poverty line earning less than US$14 per 
person, per month, according to the national living standards survey conducted in 2010-2011. There are 
regional disparities in the poverty rate ranging from 25 percent in big cities such as Kathmandu to 50 
percent in some parts of the country. Arguably, the ‘welfare deficit’ fuelled by growing disenchantment 
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with the state and its policies manifested in a ‘democratic deficit’ that Maoists sought to address through 
the insurgency. While the government response to the insurgency was marked by failure to 
institutionalize democracy by promoting inclusion, representation, and responsiveness (Thapa and 
Sharma, 2011), the Maoist insurgency had its own economic cost as the state was forced to redirect 
resources to fight it at the expense of dwindling resources in developmental areas and political 
organizations such as Kathmandu Municipality. In recent decades, democratic transition was 
accompanied by the concept of devolution and self-governance guided by the country’s commitment to 
economic neoliberalism. Donor agencies, which funded up to 30% of the country’s budget, insisted on 
embracing self-sustenance and wider partnership – a transition marked by the adoption of neoliberalist 
thinking in state institutions that put organizations such as Kathmandu Metropolitan City (KMC) in the 
spotlight as they increasingly look for ways to strengthen their institutional role and fiscal capacities7. The 
stage was set with the Local Self Governance Act 1999, which provides wider autonomy and a legal 
framework for the local governments to take various decisions independently in a more enterprising way 
that apes the market mechanism, particularly in areas of local taxation, parking permits, and licensing. 
Buildings and open spaces within the Municipality are seen as bankable assets and an apparatus for 
maximizing municipal revenue. Not bound by geography, the expansion of neoliberalization has taken its 
own cultural forms, particularly in a context where there is relative fluidity of the urban condition, and 
‘surplus’ people who are either poor or indifferent to the state. Going by Hindman’s (2014) account, 
Kathmandu’s neoliberalism is a ‘DIY capitalism’ that emerged in the post-conflict society and reflects not 
the return of the proverbial government intervention but a call to survive on your own. For grass-roots the 
problem is not conflict, but the effect of conflict on people’s lives and livelihood, and a rejection of the 
state apparatus. The notion of rejection is entrenched in the government machinery as well. The local 
election has remained suspended for the last 10 years, and as a result, the governing structure in municipal 
                                                
7
 The centrally allocated budget for the KMC has been dwindling in recent years as evident from 22% reduction in 
2016-17 (from NRs 4.07 to 3.66 billion) over the previous year. 
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bodies lacks political mandate. For instance, Kathmandu city has not had an elected Mayor since 2006, 
and the powerful political parties at the center remain the custodians of public policies and public funds. 
 
Early efforts to institutionalize Tundikhel aimed at appropriating the Royals’ vision to modernize the city. 
The construction and expansion of perimeter roads resulted in Kathmandu’s first tree-lined boulevard, 
where social mores and elite values were enacted and embodied. They were the major routes frequently 
barricaded for visits from foreign dignitaries and sites for religious processions involving the Royals. 
Subsequently, new features were added in Tundikhel to strengthen the notion of the state as a provider 
and the people as receivers. The introduction of Ratna Park in 1962, Khula Manch (open assembly) in 
1973, and rebuilding of the parade ground (1983) contrasted with the invisible social barrier that 
historically existed in Tundikhel. However, counter-intuitively this led to the fragmentation of this linear 
space, creating boundaries and helping to strengthen institutional controls. These efforts brought together 
two institutions – KMC and the Nepalese Army – with a diametrically opposite vision, purpose and 
reasons for their existence in instituting shared control and ownership over the space. While not explicitly 
highlighting the mechanisms underlying such a connection, it can be argued that the imposition of 
regulatory instruments across different parts of Tundikhel firmly established institutional control over it. 
For instance, Khula Manch, once a legitimating image for democracy, open to all its citizens, has been re-
appropriated with frequent barricading and access restrictions. This space was founded in 1973 by the late 
King Birendra and conceived as an open-air stage for holding political rallies, public talks and to voice 
discontentment. The name, signifying symbol of freedom (Khula means open and Manch means 
Platform) was given during one of the most draconian times in the country’s political history.  This 
designation, designed to be viewed as the state’s repudiation of space for interactive, discursive political 
gathering was however, a shrewd move that sought to contain the dissent by allocating a central space 
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that is always under surveillance. In 1984, the perimeter roads were widened, and Khula Manch was 
cordoned off, with high fences and police posts created at the entry and egress to make it easy for the 
police to swoop in at any sign of disorder. The presence of the army at the adjacent parade ground 
signalled the readiness of the authorities to clamp down on dissent. Khula Manch is, therefore, a 
quintessential space masterfully crafted by the Royals so that the demonstration or performance of dissent 
is naturally curbed. This firmly places Khula Manch into what Marvin (2013) calls a ‘presumptive space’, 
where the state withholds full rights of expression, but conceals this fact for political ends, and power is 
served by the illusion of public space.   
The institutional transgression continued in Ratna Park, which was established some four decades ago, as 
the only park in the heart of the city. During the conflict period, the park was well used by new migrants 
and low-income people looking for a place to rest. However, in 2012, KMC abruptly closed the park, 
citing unauthorized encroachment from informal traders engendering crime and prostitution. What we 
observed is a new pattern of governance that uses policing and institutional control, not just for 
reinforcing the historical dimension of ‘control’ legitimatized on the grounds of urban surveillance but 
also to achieve economic gain. Samara (2010) asserts that the use of policing under the new neoliberal 
governance, in which the understanding and practice of security are closely linked to the growth 
requirements of the market, raises important questions about the rights and citizenship of the people that 
call the city their home. The economic drive behind the closure of Ratna Park had been known to all8. 
Accordingly, the park was reopened in August 2015, and in the first month of its reopening KMC 
collected NRs 700,000 (US$ 6,560) (Ojha, 2015). This neoliberal interjection brings the park under the 
exclusive domain of elite residents, excluding the city’s poor and informal traders or the homeless 
creating its own  lists of gentries who are worthy to be called ‘the public’. Excluded from Ratna Park, the 
                                                
8
 Interview with KMC  officials revealed it has also tendered for a construction of an upmarket café with Wi-
Fi provisions which are signs of provision geared towards affluent people. 
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legitimacy of the poor and vulnerable people as the public is held in-doubt.The dominant culture thus 
institutionalizes exclusion of particular groups under vastly different conditions, and ideology, depriving 
citizenship of its emancipatory possibilities. The claim that the park has been a haven for drug use and 
anti-social behaviors, however, not only ignores the possibility of self-correction but also prevents other 
legitimate political, social, and economic functions to take place (Drummond, 2000). In fact, the state-
driven silent closure of public space was a feature of the urban landscape long before the culture of urban 
surveillance and control began. For instance, Rani Pokhari, built in the 16th century (Figure 2), has 
remained out of bounds for nearly 100 years, with vertical 10-feet-high iron bars obstructing both view 
and access. On the pond there is a Shiva temple, a Hindu god in the middle, which is accessed from a 
bridge many have not crossed in this generation. In a strange paradox, the pond, along with the temple 
and the deity, remain locked up in a society that is frequently energized through Hindu activism9. In a city 
that is famous for its public baths and Dhunge Dharas10, Rani Pokhari remains just a visual treat. 
However inexplicable the reasons might be, the century of restrictions in accessing Rani Pokhari has 
successfully erased a landmark public space from memory.   
 
The institutionalization of parts of Tundikhel offers an insight into power relations that create hierarchical 
spaces in the society, given that the latter is linked with notions of oppression and domination. Against 
the backdrop of centuries of autocratic rule, democracy in Kathmandu is in its infancy, and it still borrows 
from the legacy of the past and is rapidly gaining strength. Strangely enough, everything the state does (or 
not) is ‘Sarkari’– ‘stately’ – in Nepal. A Sarkari kam is a purpose or action that still carries an impression 
                                                
9
 Protests from Hindu activists demanding to declare the country back into a Hindu Nation are common in 
Kathmandu. Activists frequently clash with Police and the demand has political support from pro-monarchy 
parties such as Rastriya Prajatantrik Party (Kathmandu Post, 2015). 
10
 The traceable history of Dhunge Dharas or public baths goes back to 550 AD when Bhairavi, from Lichhavi 
period, built the first  Dhunge Dhara in Hadigaon (Pradhan, 1990). There are 117 Dhunge Dharas in Kathmandu 
and another 40 in Patan making them a consistent feature of city’s urbanism in the old city quarters. 
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of being above the law, and this has changed very little in post-conflict Kathmandu.  
 
Militarization  
 
Tundikhel’s first spatial militarist was the legendary General Bhimsen Thapa11. It is said that he had 
French advisers come to Nepal to train Nepalese soldiers. Over the years, this legacy led the country to 
become one of the world’s largest troop contributors to UN peacekeeping operations. Barracks were 
constructed on the east and north sides of Tundikhel, where the Government Employee’s Provident Fund 
Office now stands, and a foundry was built to manufacture cannons on the south-western side. The 
army’s presence first became apparent with the ritual of firing cannon at Tundikhel, every day at 12 noon; 
however, with the cannon came a military guard and with the guard came a guardhouse, and thus began 
the occupation by the military. 
 
 
The militarization of public space in Kathmandu is a hard reality, legitimatized through the historical 
association of ruling monarchs with the city’s cultural practices and rituals, making military presence in 
the neighborhood a common sight. The aspects of royalty and security featured rather strongly in 
residents’ psyche. The current debate on civilian supremacy over military is the result of the military’s 
controversial history in curbing democracy12 (Pathak and Uprety, 2011). In the wake of the Maoist 
conflict, the ubiquitous presence of the military and the police became a necessary evil as a 
                                                
11
 Bhimsen Thapa erected palatial residences built for himself, such as Bagh Durbar (constructed in 1805) on 
the south-eastern edge of the old city, and Sil Khana in Lagan and Sil Khana in Chhauni (both probably 
erected between 1815 and 1820). His decision to construct a palace for himself in Lagan Tol, south-west of 
Tundikhel effectively brought soldiers much closer to Tundikhel. 
12
 The military-monarchy tie was consolidated by King Mahendra through Military Act 1959 when the King 
quashed the democratically elected government and declared himself the Head of the government. 
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counterinsurgency to restore law and order, and justifiably so; therefore, it elicited far fewer adverse 
reactions than would have been expected had this not been the case from the people and the political 
parties. Both were bestowed with a lot of powers at the expense of civil liberty13. Since the ceasefire in 
2006, the political events leading up to constitutional crises, instability in governance, and frequent 
threats of ascendancy of paramilitary forces have continued to justify the military presence. Tundikhel 
today remains the most visible example of urban militarization justified as a measure to protect the 
security in urban spaces. 
 
The fact that militarization embodies imposition of controls using physical features such as barbed wire 
and high fences sets itself distinctively apart from, let’s say, the normative control administered by KMC, 
discussed in the previous section. The military’s heuristic control and expansion in Tundikhel suggest that 
hegemony and political subjugation remains alive in public spaces of nascent democracies. The 
magnitude of military controlled parts of Tundikhel has doubled in the span of the last two decades (see 
Figure 3) and now exceeds one-third of Tundikhel. It began with the establishment of army headquarters 
in the 1980s in the southernmost part of Tundikhel, and subsequently the city witnessed a gradual 
encroachment of Tundikhel by the army, using clever designations. The spaces went through a transition 
of being army sports and training grounds, and ultimately the location for new buildings effectively to a 
muted opposition. In an effort to permanently seize the space, the army has constructed new extensions to 
its headquarters in Tundikhel, exploiting the loopholes in the legal system. Under the Nepalese law, state 
                                                
13 The Organization and Association (Control) Act, 1962, proscribed political parties, demonstrations, 
political meetings, public expression, and the publication of articles. Offenders could be imprisoned for up to 
three years. The Police Organization Act provided the police with wide powers of arrest, search, and 
detention, and the Press Act banned the independent media and brought the news media under government 
control (Baral, 1977).  
 
Page 20 of 40
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cus  Ruth.Harkin@glasgow.ac.uk
Urban Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
21 
 
agencies (Sarkari offices) are not required to obtain buildings permits from the Municipality prior to the 
construction of new buildings.  
 
Accurately and precisely assessing the impacts of encroachment is a difficult task, but over time, a 
question that consistently features in intellectual and civilian forums is why should the military occupy 
central public space? And why does it not relocate to the periphery of the city, where more land could be 
available for its extending activities? In 1997, the Birendra International Convention Center in New 
Baneshwor (now the seat of the Constituent Assembly) was built, relocating the army cantonment. This 
question points towards the classic feature of military existence that is beset with contradictions. The 
important role the army has played in counterinsurgency and subsequently internal domestic conflict 
between those still hung up on the historical legacy (pro-monarchy) and everyone else (anti-monarchy) 
has led to the army seeing itself playing a prominent role in Nepalese society. On one hand, rebel 
infiltration continues to pose threats to Kathmandu, and on the other, frequent enforcement of emergency 
laws, restriction of freedom of movement, etc. have legitimatized the army’s penetration into public 
spaces. In response to the Maoist insurgents using key urban spaces as a material location for hegemonic 
claims, the army saw the occupation of central areas as being equally important to retain its own symbolic 
supremacy. Routledge (2010: 1296), in his study of urban protest and democracies in Nepal, asserts that 
public space is a more hybrid version of the civil society that incorporates elements of both liberal and 
radical democracy – an integral part of the state and a sphere of hegemony, wherein consent is 
manufactured (albeit through extremely complex mediums, diverse institutions, and constantly changing 
processes).  
The severity of power split and its manifestation in public space in Kathmandu could not be fully 
comprehended if the historic power of the military was not taken into consideration in the public space 
discourse. The whole political history of Nepal since medieval times until the abolition of the monarchy 
Page 21 of 40
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cus  Ruth.Harkin@glasgow.ac.uk
Urban Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
22 
 
in 2008 can be summed up in the powers of the military being elevated through harnessing the autocratic 
rule of the monarchs. This ‘elevation’ of power underwent spatial manifestation as the military was 
granted guardianship of some of the strategic monuments and central sites in Kathmandu. The powers of 
the army remained ‘above the law’, with just one figure-head above them – the King, popularly believed 
to be the incarnation of Lord Vishnu. Since 1744, the military institution in Nepal was known as The 
Royal Nepalese Army (RNA). The integration of the military with royalty that existed for centuries 
displays the characteristics of the triumvirate of nation/religion/king observed in Bangkok. In discussing 
the power hierarchy in Thailand, Dovey (2001: 268) argues that “all forms of political power, including 
military coups and democratic constitutions, need to honour the triumvirate to succeed”. The triumvirate, 
however, came to an abrupt end in 2008 with the abolition of the monarchy, and the term ‘Royal’ was 
subsequently dropped from its name, signifying its new purpose to be the protector of the newfound 
democracy. The name may have changed, but the army’s loyalty to the aristocrats has remained intact, 
and with that, their presence in the public space has remained unchanged. In fact, their growing tendency 
to keep civilians out of the central public space questions their real motives in the new context. 
Padawangi (2013), in discussing urban activism, states that Jakarta’s Thamrin-Sudirman corridor, which 
has been the site for public rallies or demonstrations, has been regularly subject to militarization in order 
to prevent the ‘unwanted people’ from demonstrating there, particularly during the New Order. Thus, the 
subjection of public space provision under the authority of the ruling power makes those spaces more 
prone to becoming celebratory spaces of power and wealth in an unequal society.   
In addition to being ‘politically-led’, the army’s current role in the socio-political setting in Nepal and its 
resistance to any diffusion of power should also be seen as being ‘neoliberal-led’. In the recent decade, 
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the military has seen its size grow three times amid widespread budgetary retrenchment14. This has meant 
that the army increasingly faces a compulsion to run its own welfare (its own hospitals and schools) and 
find different ways to generate revenue. The Nepalese Army already runs commercial ventures (such as 
petrol pumps, banquet halls and, more recently, garment factories) (Kathmandu Post, 2016), and is known 
to harbor real-estate interests. Some see this as an emergence of a new public–private and military 
partnership as the new paradigm in the new democratic Nepal (Bhandari, 2014). This puts the army into 
the same existential dilemma as a poorly managed state enterprise searching for new ways to survive. 
To sum up, the military acting as the key institution of guardianship, vigilantly preserving law and order, 
is common across many countries in the global south. However, what is unique about Kathmandu is that, 
far from receding into the societal backdrop, while helping the government uphold its intentions, in the 
process the military uphold their own privileged socio-political status. This, coupled with their tricky 
organizational existence amid the ongoing political conflict in Nepal and neoliberal penetration, is the 
major influence in (re)shaping Tundikhel.  
 
.  
 
Insert Figure 3 
 
Informalization  
 
                                                
14
 The number of soldiers grew from 45,000 in 2001 to 90,000 in 2005 when the army was mobilized to counter the 
insurgency (Pradhan, 2009) and the total spending has increased to 1.4% of GDP in 2010 from 0.99% in 1988 
(Rogers, 2012). 
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Informality in public space is a claim-making process and can be characterized as an eruption of informal 
activities that can range from informal trading and homeless people living on the streets or public spaces 
to cars and vehicles parked under the Municipality’s ‘No parking’ sign. They could also be impromptu 
sports activities or a range of other activities lacking any designated space. In most cities of the global 
south, informality regularly intersects with formality. For instance, it is completely accepted that the 
‘formal’ use of spaces is controlled to introduce a series of other (informal) activities (political rallies), 
functions (informal trading zones), or religious parades (such as Durga puja in Kolkata, Gai Jatra in 
Kathmandu, and Ganapati Bappa in Mumbai) for which state institutions do not allocate formal space. 
Thus, the ‘laws of people’ take precedence over the ‘institutional laws’ as guardians of these public 
spaces. Ultimately, in the global south, the publicness of its cities and spaces is measured from the extent, 
efficiency, and effectiveness of these crossovers.   
In Kathmandu, there are no designated public spaces, but any space that is not privately owned is called 
Sarvajanik. Such spaces are mostly state-owned and go beyond their legal definition. Sarva means ‘all’ 
and Janik means ‘people’ in English, so any space that is accessible to all people is actually Sarvajanik, 
or Sarvajanik sthala – a place that is ‘accessible to all’. Publicly owned land and spaces tend to be above 
the law in Nepal, and all, in their capacity as users, are “citizens” and have the same rights over the space. 
The occupation of such space, by ordinary people, goes beyond the mere behavioral response to the 
context; it simultaneously shows what Perera (2009: 54) calls “a form of adaptation, questioning, 
resistance, and transformation”. Through observing discursive practices in both sides of the municipal 
laws, informal rules and norms develop both independently of and in combination with formal rules, 
making informality part of the institutionalization process and a strong contender for space. Historically, 
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right through the 1990s, the city saw the Panchayati15 regime allowing an explosion of informal markets 
as a mechanism to curb political discontentment brewing under the covert operations of Maoist soldiers. 
Subsequently, a large swathe of Khula Manch turned into a thriving flea market that catered not just to the 
crowd gathered for political assemblies but also to the wider public. These markets were fostered under 
the controlled conditions of the Municipality and in tandem with the democratic movement that revolves 
around occupancy. The occupancy refers to not just physical space but, as Benjamin (2013: 724) argues, 
“is an appropriation of spaces through the ‘embedding’ of municipal government into popular society. 
Such practices fuel an autonomous political process at the municipal level that reflects a new alliance and 
coalition politics”. 
Following the political ceasefire in 2006, KMC moved to regularize the city’s public spaces as part of the 
city’s environmental improvements and beautification program16. KMC’s subsequent move to ban 
informal markets from Tundikhel was fiercely contested by two principal groups – Nepal Street Vendors 
Association and Street Market Association. The conjoined organizations resulted in the development of a 
powerful informal force, often supported by the left-wing politicians who were promoting the rights of 
the informal traders. While such resistance recognizes that the informal actors are here to stay and 
somehow need to be made part of the new democracy, their access to Tundikhel is dependent on the 
strength of their negotiation with KMC. Benjamin (2013) aptly calls it vote bank politics in his study of 
Indian cities such as Bangalore and Delhi. The power dynamics are not always visibly manifested, but as 
Appadurai (2001: 42) argues, informal actors also build deep democracies through their organization and 
development of temporary infrastructure. Such democracies and infrastructure are regularly ruptured in 
                                                
15 The Panchayati system of governance was introduced in the Nepalese political context by the late King Mahendra 
through a new constitution in 1962 following dissolution of democratically elected government. Panchayati system is 
a vernacular form of local governance that sees one party rule and election through political nominations. Panchayati 
political system prevailed in Nepal until 1990. 
 
16
 KMC adopted ‘beautification' as part of the city's environmental agenda since 2003 when the city hosted SAARC 
summit. The imposition of state emergency by then King Gyanendra during that time helped to ward off any 
opposition and sustain the program.  
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Tundikhel as informal vendors are denied access to public spaces, relegating them to the footpaths of the 
perimeter roads. A string of informal vendors is visible on the periphery, waiting to lay their claim on 
Tundikhel. The testimonies from vendors located in Tundikhel reveal a concern with livelihood strategies 
dependent on the locational value of Tundikhel. 
 
 
Paradoxically, the process of eviction and encroachment may have been cyclical, the process itself is 
random and the outcome unpredictable. Brown’s (2004) study of street traders in Kathmandu observed an 
uneasy relation with Municipal police who at times evict and at other times demand payment at cut price. 
Under such circumstances, power is associated with domination, and the Municipal police becomes yet 
another actor of such statutory instrument. Brown et al (2010) argue about the role of the Municipal 
police in the enforcement of law, questioning to what extent such enforcement is apparent harassment and 
institutional policy as a livelihood strategy for the underpaid officials. Their act of taking money from the 
poor in the form of weekly or daily haftas17 should be seen as quasi-legal exchanges where multiple 
rationalized self-interests go hand in hand in the form of bribery and harassment as a by-product of 
institutionalization and the state’s interests in ‘control’ and ‘surveillance’. 
Evicted traders keep returning to Tundikhel, each time better equipped and skilled, to defy Municipal 
regulations and operate illegally across major thoroughfares. Most recently on April 14, 2014, the 
Municipality issued a public notice urging all vendors to keep off Tundikhel, and active policing began. 
Kumar Sapkota, Chair of Self-employed Traders Association, laments the eviction of traders without a 
realistic alternative. He asserts, “Street vendors who are self-employed traders should not be evicted 
without a long-term alternative. There are 30,000 vendors in the capital of which 15,000 are women. 
                                                
17
 Hafta is a protection money charged by corrupt policemen or local goons to safeguard informal businesses. The 
term Hafta originates from week, indicating weekly collection of extortion fee. 
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They should not be evicted without a long-term alternative” (Kathmandu Post, 2014). Thus, informality is 
increasingly a formidable contender for the public space within the contested dimension, operating in 
close entanglement with statutory institutions. Situated at the verge of legality, informality is constantly 
intertwined with the Municipal law and is at the discretion of the political, institutional, or military power. 
In a strange paradox, KMC is yet to devise a policy on the use of, or what can be accommodated in, the 
public space and very often, operate in an ad hoc manner18. Arguably, in Kathmandu, informality is 
understood not just as a mode of the ‘ordinary’, but it has equally accommodated an elite informality 
carried out often in complicity with statutory institutions.  
                                                
18
 The case in point is the emergence of the new religious complex in the space next to  Rani Pokhari. In a classic 
change of hands, Kathmandu Municipality dismantled informal markets to accommodate religious groups affording 
permanent structures.   Since both religious/social groups are part of the informal coalition of political and elitist 
coterie, the interests of urban poor is easily displaced. 
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Urban rupturing: (un)making of public space  
 
Democracy or lack of it is manifested in the city’s public spaces. In the process of restoring democracy in 
Nepal, the city has moved from war to peace, from monarchy to republicanism, from being a Hindu state 
to secularism and from a unitary to potentially a federal state in the last two decades (Jha, 2016). This 
transformation is ongoing and far from complete. Episodically, political cadres along with their leaders 
besiege the city and its epicenter, Tundikhel. The military steps in with barbed wire and batons. The 
ensuing struggle ends with an announcement by the Chief Executive of KMC, who claims Khula Manch 
has been closed for an indefinite period. Such framing of contemporary spatial politics in everyday life 
displays the confluence of three historically unique and intersecting powers of modalities: 
institutionalization, militarization, and informalization as described in the previous section underpinned 
Tundikhel’s transformation. Institutionalization of parts of Tundikhel offers us insights into power 
relations that create hierarchical spaces in the society. As an example of ‘exclusionary’ space, pockets of 
Tundikhel have embodies urban relegation from their role as being prime social spaces to spaces within 
which militarization is being articulated and somewhat reinforced. On the other hand, situated at the verge 
of legality and at the margin, informality is constantly entangled with the Municipal law, well within the 
force field of Tundikhel. Drawing the three processes together to understand their transformative impact 
on Tundikhel seemingly presents many challenges. These challenges are conflicting because each process 
offers unique perspective on Tundikhel as observed in Marvin’s (2013) Tibetan ‘porous space’ or 
Benjamin’s (2008) ‘occupancy urbanism’ or Hackenbroch’s (2013) ‘organized encroachment of the 
powerful’. Since public space is never homogeneous, “the dimensions and extent of its publicness are 
highly differentiated from instance to instance” (Smith and Low, 2006: 3) and require wider study. Our 
study shows that together these processes point to the complexity around Tundikhel’s transformation that 
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is not easily explained by individual perspective. This complexity relates not only to the specific and 
limited form of democracy that prevails in Tundikhel but also to how a differentiated power structure is 
determining access and control, staking claims, disrupting activities, and ultimately rupturing the space. 
The forces at play are both individual and institutional, formal and informal, civil and military. As a 
contemporary urban space that enables the contestation of power relations (Routledge, 1994, 2010), 
Tundikhel has become a physical space that itself is being contested.  
The paper argues that the confluence of the three dominant modalities of power results in what I call 
‘spatial estrangement’ – a process of (un)making of public spaces through ‘urban rupturing’. The 
evolution of ‘rupturing’ is evident first in the ‘fragmentation’ of public space, both physical and symbolic. 
Today, only one-sixth of Tundikhel is open to the public (see Figure 3), while other pockets of Tundikhel 
remain symbolic sterile spaces, under either institutional or military control. Barbed wire, high iron gates, 
army patrols, and Municipal wardens create boundaries and prevent access. It is no longer a pure, 
autonomous repository of power, people, or institutions but instead divided with boundaries and infested 
with significant apathy among the city’s informal groups that are forced to sit just outside the boundary. 
These spaces are adorned with hard boundaries that are quite defensive and lacking in civic engagement, 
showing the state’s approach to treating public space in the same way as buildings or objects – assigning 
territories and boundaries that ignore the culturally shaped organic relations that existed for centuries. 
Sennett’s (2006) explanation to define edges is pertinent here, which states that they are of two kinds – 
boundaries and borders. A boundary is an edge where things end; a border is an edge where different 
groups interact. At borders, organisms become more interactive, porous membranes, due to the meeting 
of different species or physical conditions. A boundary is a guarded territory where no transgression takes 
place. Tundikhel witnessed borders morphing into boundaries to compartmentalize the space into six 
pockets of various degree of control that are both political and institutional. Ironically, these boundaries, 
once the hallmark of the conflict period, are being naturalized. The army’s constant presence generates 
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fear, dominating both public space and the everyday life of civilians. Paradoxically, on one hand, the new 
government-translated democratic ideas are embodied in swatantra-sarbajanik (which translates as 
freedom-public) dialectic, and on the other, they reproduce the authoritarian state’s administrative habits 
and procedures (particularly from the time of the absolute monarchy) to realize law and order through the 
army. Current democratic deliberation pays a great deal of attention to controlling, dividing, and ruling 
but overlooks the balance between good governance and authority.  
 
 
Beyond fragmentation, there are efforts to assign a sense of ‘permanence’ that takes the ‘rupturing 
process’ to the next level. By allocating specific use(s) and erecting structures, the ‘publicness’ is 
permanently taken away from Tundikhel, restricting social interaction, constraining individual liberties, 
and excluding the public, or public activities. The apparent imperviousness and impermeability across 
different pockets create spaces with new spatial identities that set them apart from the historic Tundikhel, 
which was ‘one large space’. A large part of Tundikhel is already built up by the Nepalese Army, while in 
recent years new elitist outfits such as Hindu religious groups have built permanent structures. A creeping 
elitism in public space resonates  Hackenbroch’s (2013) ‘organised encroachment’ for which state 
colludes with institutions that may not always have the public interest in mind. Further, the neoliberal 
ambition of the current government (from the state’s claims in ownership to introduction of entry fee in 
Ratna Park) reproduces that class hierarchy and governs who is allowed access and who is denied it. 
Thus, at the mezzanine level of the confluence of the triumvirate, we observe a tension between the 
formal regime and informality, a battle of access and privilege and luxury and livelihood. Ultimately, this 
urban rupturing points to the possible disconnection of Tundikhel from the city, its history, and wider 
culture. This ongoing process has the power to erase the history and legacy of the space from the public 
memory such that the public space is not recognizable anymore. These phenomena are manifested by 
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different multiple actions: eradication of structure/ buildings, adding fences, and changing activities. The 
prolonged imposition of ‘control’ is, therefore, a condition, which leads to an urban amnesia towards the 
city’s history. In Tundikhel, Rani Pokhari’s access restriction and muted opposition epitomizes how 
spatial rupturing leads to the material deletion of public space from the public mind. The amnesia is all 
the more troubling since its mutilations are ignored and its role in the city’s urbanism rapidly loses 
relevance. Tundikhel was originally three miles in length and 300 yards in width, spreading from Rani 
Pokhari to Dasharath Stadium. Major parts of Tundikhel are now permanently lost through various 
developments and ever widening perimeter roads, barriers, and iron gates restricting access and rupturing 
the space. Ironically, space has shrunk by more than half in just 40 years, a fact that is deleted from the 
minds of the generation that is old enough to remember the past.  
 
 
To conclude, the paper informs the current debates on whether the public space in global south is 
quintessentially public. It argues that Tundikhel remains tightly controlled by the interplay of the three 
dominant modalities of power, and this in part reflects the traditional social values and notions that 
uphold denial, restriction, and oppression in the use of public space. The paper advocates that judging by 
the ambition, depth, and extent of impact, the confluence of dominant modalities of power assumes a 
hegemonic character powerful enough to trigger fundamental shifts in the processes and relationships 
through which public space is fragmented, modified, and eventually deleted from the memory – a 
phenomenon of urban rupturing. The paper contends that hypocrisy is inherent in the public space agenda 
in Kathmandu witnessed through a gradual decline in the publicness of Tundikhel amid organized claims 
and interventions borne out of an urban condition that not only maligns the public space agenda but also 
creeps into other spheres of urban development. Finally, this empirical study exposes the limits to the 
specific form of democracy that people enjoy (or suffer) in contemporary Kathmandu. Perhaps it also 
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inspires us to push those limits, sending warning signals to other cities in the global south with similar 
contexts. What is needed is an understanding of the distinctive nature and range of possibilities in public 
spaces in cities of the global south. The true benefits of public space thus lie in its becoming not just 
public but a place. 
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Figure 1: Tundikhel in the context of the city 
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Figure 2: Shahid Gate (left) and Rani Pokhari (right) 
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Figure 3:  The compartmentalisation of Tundikhel, Kathmandu 
 
Ranipokhari  
Well maintained by KMC with small office on the 
south west corner of the site. Water level receding. 
Access closed for a century 
Ratna Park  
Lacks proper maintenance after the democracy 
period; main entrance from north side. Access with 
an entry fee. 
Khula Munch  
Symbol of democracy.  
Access given to political rallies through permit 
system 
Parade Ground 
Sporadic parade and some cultural practice too.  
Access closed. 
Sports Ground 
Not defined. 
Access open. 
Army Quarter 
Under army occupation. Army Headquarter and 
Sports Ground 
Access closed for civilians 
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